According to a widespread view, the same constraints that limit the use of otherwise immoral measures in individual self-defense apply to collective self-defense too. I try to show that this view has radical implications at the level of jus in bello, implications which have not been fully appreciated. In particular, if the necessity condition must be satisfi ed in all cases of killing in war, then most fi ghting would turn out to be unjust. One way to avoid this result is to adopt a contractualist view of killing in war, a view which interprets the necessity condition in a way that is more permissive with regard to killing combatants in war. At least in this respect, a contractualist view of killing in war has an advantage over other candidates in explaining how wars might be fought justly.
is even worse with regard to the necessity condition, 3 especially insofar as it concerns (if indeed it does) jus in bello. Th is paper is an attempt to fi ll this gap. I seek to show that, properly understood, the necessity condition leads to very demanding constraints on the use of force in war, constraints which cast doubt on the possibility that wars can be fought justly. I then argue that this conclusion lends support to a recent interpretation of just war theory, one that emphasizes the contractual nature of the war convention.
I. Necessity and Proportionality: Preliminaries
Let me start by exploring the meaning of the necessity condition and the proportionality condition in individual self-defense. Some writers seem to assume that the necessity condition is no diff erent to the proportionality condition because choosing the least harmful course of action (which is what the necessity condition requires) is the same as choosing the proportionate one. Th is view, however, seems wrong. Th ink of an aggressor, A, posing a threat to a potential victim, V. Even if, as a matter of fact, the only way V can stop A from carrying out an unjust attack upon her is to carry out a self-defensive act, D, which would otherwise be immoral (or illegal), carrying out D might still be disproportionate to the unjust attack (=cause much more harm than the unjust attack would) and hence be ruled out by the proportionality condition. Th e distinction between the necessity condition and the proportionality condition can thus be expressed as follows: Th e necessity condition concerns the relation between some defensive act, D, and all alternative defensive acts D1, D2… Dn. It requires that D be less harmful than all these alternative acts. Th e relevant comparison is independent of the threat posed to V by A. Whatever its nature and magnitude, V is required to take the least harmful measure to ("Although the principle of proportionality enjoys widespread support, it is generally ill defi ned, misunderstood, wrongly applied, and without any feasible operational defi nition"). Th e legal notion of proportionality in international law fares no better, as shown by Abraham Bell, "Optimal Proportionality in the Law of War" (available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ colloquium/international/documents/Bell.pdf ), p. 3 ("Proportionality means diff erent things in diff erent contexts within the law of war, and the scope and application of the concept is far from clear in many cases"). 3 See George Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin, Defending Humanity: When Force is Justifi ed and Why (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 93 ("Very few scholars pay careful attention to the requirement of necessity, even though it is a universal requirement of self-defense… Th e literature of international law speaks of the requirement of necessity as well as of proportionality, but no real sustained attention is paid to either of these criteria").
block it. In contrast, the proportionality condition contains no reference to alternative defensive acts, only to the relation between D and the unjust threat . If D is disproportionate to the threat, then it is ruled out by the proportionality condition regardless of the existence or the nature of alternative defensive actions that might prevent the threat from materialization.
To these two conditions, we should add a third which is usually overlooked, namely, the Success Condition. 4 Th e fi rst question that V must ask herself is which actions are available to her that could reasonably be expected to block the threat. If the answer is none, then V has no right of self-defense against A (that is, no right to carry out otherwise immoral acts against A). If only one act, D, passes this primary test, then the necessity condition is satisfi ed by way of default. If more than one act passes the primary test, the act that is least harmful to A must be selected. D must then face the proportionality test. If D passes it, V is justifi ed in carrying out the act. If not, V is doomed. She will have to suff er the aggression with no moral means of self-protection.
Th e order of conditions is, then, success->necessity->proportionality. V must fi rst establish that D can block the unjust attack, then that it is the least harmful way to do so, and fi nally that it is proportionate to the attack. Th is order refl ects an ascent in the severity of the moral constraint imposed on V. Th e success condition is the weakest constraint, because if some act is not expected to provide any defense at all, surely it cannot enjoy the protection of the right to self-defense. Th e necessity condition is more demanding, because it prohibits V from taking a course of action that is expected to block an unjust aggression -simply because there is a less harmful one which could do the same job. Th e proportionality condition is the most demanding constraint because it prohibits V from doing D in order to block an unjust attack, even when D is expected to block it, and even when it is expected to do so in the least harmful way .
5 Th at the proportionality condition poses a more demanding 4 See my "Th e Success Condition for Legitimate Self-Defense," Ethics 118 (2008): 659-686. 5 Here and in the rest of the paper, I'll be assuming a subjective reading of the conditions under discussion. What matters for the legitimacy of D is not whether D is in fact eff ective, necessary, or proportional, but that it is reasonably believed to be so by the agent. For the sake of simplicity, I shall often use objective language (e.g. "D is disproportionate to the threat"), but I'll always be assuming a subjective one. On this point I am in disagreement with Mellow, who explicitly accepts an objectivist view of the justifi cation for self-defense. See David Mellow, "Iraq: A Morally Justifi ed Resort to War," Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (2006), 299-300 and note 18. Because he holds this view, he believes that the justifi cation for war is essentially retroactive, which leads him to justify the war in Iraq by its actual results as he judges them. Th is retroactive viewpoint explains his worry about counterfactuals when it comes to the application of the proportionality condition; see Mellow, "Counterfactuals and the Proportionality Criterion." constraint on self-defense than the necessity condition explains the fact that while no modern legal system omits the necessity condition from the list of conditions for legitimate self-defense, some omit the proportionality condition or reserve it only for extreme cases. But it is not only the demanding nature of the proportionality condition that explains the lack of consensus surrounding it, but the apparent unfairness involved. It seems unfair that when a self-defensive act, D, is necessary but disproportionate, it is V who is doomed to suff er rather than A.
II. Th e Necessity Condition and Warfare
Th e analysis of the previous section helps us to see how the application of the necessity condition leads to opposing conclusions regarding the morality of war -to weaker restrictions, on the one hand, and to stronger restrictions, on the other. Or so it seems.
Why might one think that correct application of the necessity condition should relax the constraints on warfare? Th e answer has to do with the essential future-oriented nature of self-defense. For an otherwise immoral/illegal act, D, to be justifi ed under the right of self-defense, it must be reasonably expected to provide defense from some future aggression. If D cannot be thought to provide such a defense but is instead justifi ed by reference to some past aggression, then though it might be justifi ed on other grounds, such as retribution, it cannot fi nd solace under the right to self-defense. Hurka shows that what follows with regard to the proportionality condition is that the proportionality sought is not between the self-defensive act and some past act of aggression, but between the self-defensive act and some potential aggression in the future. 6 Similarly, I should add, with the success and the necessity conditions. Insofar as acts of warfare are conceived as responses to enemy attacks in the past, there is a temptation to judge them according to their success or necessity in appropriately responding to such attacks. Th is means that if the original enemy attack was not that severe, the counter-attack ought not to be that severe either, a view assumingly in line with the necessity condition. Th e temptation exists in ordinary wars too, but it especially applies to low-intensity ones, which look like a series of attacks, counter-attacks, and counter-counter-attacks, each allegedly deriving its justifi cation from the need to respond to the one preceding it. Once this temptation is resisted, as it should be, states might be allowed to respond to a perceived unjust attack against them with an attack which is much harsher and more destructive than the one they themselves suff ered if they have a reasonable basis for believing that such a response is necessary to block future attacks.
One might object by saying that harsh responses to unjust attacks presume a kind of foreknowledge that we humans don't have. Even retroactively we can only rarely determine whether such a response was necessary, but prospectively we almost never can. Hence, we must adjust the severity of our responses to that of the attacks against us, and refrain from striking back in a harsh manner just because such a strike is envisioned to prevent some attack, or series of attacks, in the future. However, such epistemic modesty regarding our capacity to assess what some enemy might do to us in case we don't act in a certain way leads to a prohibition against a less harsh response too. After all, the justifi cation for this less harsh response must also be the prevention of future attacks, but to make such a claim, one would have to be reasonably sure (a) that the less harsh attack would deliver the goods, and (b) that there is no other way of doing so. Moreover, condition (a) seems actually harder to satisfy in the less harsh response than in the harsher one, for the simple reason that a less harsh response would usually have a weaker chance of either deterring the enemy or signifi cantly undermining the enemy infrastructure. Let me explain why.
Regarding infrastructure, it seems that a limited response would have a merely negligible eff ect in preventing future attacks. Th e point about deterrence is more complex. Deterrence functions diff erently in diff erent contexts. Particularly relevant to the present discussion is the distinction between the measures that might deter potential wrongdoers who are motivated by sheer self-interest and those that might deter wrongdoers who are ideologically motivated. For the former, a moderately higher cost than benefi t would usually be suffi cient to deter them. For the latter, a much higher cost would be required. Th e role of deterrence in international relations tends to be closer to its role in ideologically motivated wrongdoing. If the response which group A gets for its attack on group B is a moderate one, the response will hurt, but usually will not convince members of group A to refrain from further attacks in the future. It might even increase their motivation to do so by adding an element of revenge to their considerations. To deter them from further attacks, the response of group B must often be so painful that further attacks on the part of group A would be regarded as out of the question. 7 All the more so with strongly ideological organizations like Hamas or Al-Qaeda who are ready to sacrifi ce a lot in pursuit of their goals and who glorify martyrdom, extolling the virtues of those who die (or kill themselves) in the war against the enemy ( shaheeds ). 8 However, some forms of deterrence are nevertheless available even vis-à-vis organizations like these. A well-known statement by the Hizbullah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, can serve as an example. In August 2006, shortly after the war with Israel had ended, Nasrallah announced that "he would not have ordered the capture of two Israeli soldiers had he known it would lead to such a response."
9 It is hard to determine how sincere Nasrallah was in this declaration, and it is premature to predict whether, to what extent, and how long he will indeed be more restrained in the future.
10 (People tend to forget or to underestimate the losses and pain they suff ered from their adversaries in the past and also to overestimate their ability to defeat them in the present without suff ering similar losses.) It does, however, seem reasonable to assume that a less harsh response on the part of Israel would have failed to bring about such restraint.
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Th e reader should not get the impression that, in my view, as individuals and as groups, we must respond with full force to any unjust attack against us. Often a moderate "reasonable" response would suffi ce by virtue of the clear message it sends to the attacker, "Hey there, don't mess with me." Signaling to (2002) , 165-183. In Berejikian's own view, the most eff ective stance is a "fi rm-but-fair" one because excessive bullying diminishes deterrence. Th at sounds logical, but note that a "fi rm" response would often be "disproportionate" in the regular use of the term.
8 With regard to terrorists there is a further reason why only especially harsh measures might achieve the required defense, namely, that terrorists are "unwilling to enter into trusting relationships with their enemies" (Matthew Noah Smith, "Terrorism, Shared Rules and Trust," Journal of Political Philosophy 18 [2008] 216). Th eir contempt for the shared rules of war makes them "utterly untrustworthy" (ibid.), which means that the terrorists cannot be trusted to "learn the lesson" in the way other people, who are willing "to share a society with other human beings" (ibid. 215), would learn it. Hence, the lesson must be forced upon the terrorists-drilled forcefully into their minds, so to say-for them to be deterred from future acts of violence. Th is would involve sending an unequivocally clear message, one which can only be conveyed through the use of harsh measures. our rivals and enemies that we are "serious about it" and that we won't be trodden upon is sometimes enough to break the cycle of violence. But, of course, deterrence of this kind can only work provided that when my enemy does strike again, I respond in a much harsher way; otherwise I'll make a fool of myself and make myself easy prey after having proven that I can only bark, not bite. 12 To this one should add that countries and organizations fi ghting against liberal democracies often perceive them as spoiled, weak, and hedonistic 13 and hence short of the mental determination and fervor required to get involved in a real war. Against this background, restrained and (typically) lowrisk attacks from the air or the sea might not only fail to deter such organizations, but in fact bring about the opposite eff ect by confi rming the above perception.
All this seems to imply that the necessity condition imposes weaker constraints on self-defense than commonly thought. However, as indicated above, the application of the necessity condition to warfare also seems to lead to stronger restrictions. Th e reason for this is the following. If killing human beings in war is justifi ed in terms of self-defense, then all the standard conditions for self-defense must serve as constraints on waging war too. Th is is most obvious for those who subscribe to what I shall call 'Th e Individualistic View of Justifi ed Killing in War [IJW]', according to which to fi ght justly is to be able to explain, as it were, to each enemy individual who is about to be killed in war, how his or her fate is justifi ed according to the standard conditions of self-defense. Th is is so because, as McMahan puts it, [T] he morality of defense in war is continuous with the morality of individual self-defense. Indeed, justifi ed warfare just is the collective of individual rights of self-and other-defense in a coordinated manner against a common threat. 14 On IJW, the same moral limits on killing that apply to the coordinated defense of three people against one apply also to three against three, or to 10,000 vs. 10,000. If the killing of Bob cannot be grounded in the right to selfdefense when Bob alone poses an illegitimate threat, it cannot be so grounded just because he poses such a threat together with 10,000 other people, i.e. an 12 For a similar approach, see Bell, "Optimal Proportionality in the Law of War," Part II, who argues that the common understanding of the proportionality condition makes it counterproductive. To achieve deterrence, states must convey a clear message "that suffi ciently high penalties will be imposed on aggressors" (p. 23, italics added). 13 entire army. Th us, as far as "the deep morality of war" is concerned, to borrow McMahan's expression, 15 the necessity condition must be fulfi lled in each case of killing in war. Th e same holds true for the success condition because, as we saw above, the success condition precedes the necessity condition in order of justifi cation, and must be satisfi ed before moving on to the necessity condition. An act of killing in war that makes no contribution to blocking the threats imposed by the enemy (to the collective as a whole or to individual members of it) cannot fi nd solace in the right to self-defense. 16 Th e problem is that if the necessity condition and the success condition apply to jus in bello, we seem to be on the safe road to pacifi sm 17 because clearly much of the killing taking place in war is either non-eff ective or unnecessary for victory. Th is means that wars inevitably involve impermissible killing and hence cannot be morally justifi ed.
To further clarify this point, consider a domestic analogy. Suppose I refuse to pay protection money to the local mafi a. Th e mafi a members threaten to burn down my business, a common tactic against stubborn non-payers. Everybody knows that these guys are serious. Suppose further that the local police are at best impotent and at worst controlled by the mafi a, so that I can expect no help there. In these circumstances, I have a right to protect myself and my property from mafi a aggression, even if this involves the use of lethal measures. However, I don't have a right to go around and kill any member of the mafi a in the country (or even in the county) just because I want to defend myself from the above threat. I must make sure that such killing can reasonably be thought to be both eff ective and necessary in providing the required defense; otherwise it could not be justifi ed under the right of self-defense. Similarly in war, the fact that an unjust enemy threatens me does not in itself justify the killing of each and all members of the enemy side. I must fi rst make sure that each act of killing is both eff ective and necessary.
To this I should add that the constraint posed by the necessity condition is stronger the less culpable the aggressor is for the threat he poses. It is bad enough to kill somebody unnecessarily when the person killed is fully culpable for an unjust attack. It is much worse to kill him unnecessarily if he is less than fully culpable -which is precisely the case with most soldiers, especially conscripts, who are at most only partially culpable for the threat they pose.
In these circumstances, asking the fi ghting parties to make sure that each act of warfare is both eff ective and necessary makes a lot of sense -yet, in practice, it is a request that is almost impossible to fulfi ll.
How could friends of IJW respond to this challenge? Th e fi rst response would be to emphasize the subjective nature of the conditions under discussion. In introducing the problem under discussion, I said that the problem for IJW is that much of the killing taking place in war is either non-eff ective or unnecessary for victory. However, as I myself noted earlier, 18 these constraints on self-defense should be understood subjectively. Th is means that what matters is not the ex post estimate that much of the killing (and wounding and harm) in wars is non-eff ective or unnecessary, but the ex ante estimate about the eff ectiveness and necessity of individual acts of warfare. And once this shift to the subjective point of view is made, it becomes clear -or so this response suggests -that, in most cases, the killing, wounding and harm involved in war do meet the success and the necessity conditions. In most cases, when soldiers open fi re on their enemies, attack their bases, and bomb their posts, they act under the reasonable belief that doing so will make a contribution to the defeat of the enemy and that this contribution is necessary .
Let me strengthen this response by connecting it to Kim Ferzan's account of self-defense. 19 According to Ferzan, the right to kill in self-defense requires the existence of an objective "triggering condition," namely that A culpably intends to kill V, as well as a subjective condition to the eff ect that V predicts that harm will occur if she doesn't act. If the triggering condition is not met, V can, at most, have an excuse for carrying out D, but no justifi cation. If it is met, then " any likelihood of harm should be suffi cient for self-defense." 20 Th ough Ferzan's emphasis is on the likelihood of harm, the same should apply to the likelihood of the eff ectiveness and of the necessity of D in blocking it. According to Ferzan, if A culpably intends to harm V, then even if the means he uses are only 1% likely to succeed, V has a right to carry out D against him in order to prevent the threat from materializing. Th e same seems to hold if the probability of the threat materializing is very high (close to 100%) but the probability of D blocking it is only 1%. Ferzan says that if V knows that defensive force is not necessary, she may not kill A, 21 to imply that so long as she doesn't know this, and furthermore holds the contrary belief, then even if the belief (that D is necessary) is a weak one, she still has a right to kill A. Th is, however, seems to make the necessity condition mute as a constraint on self-defense. If any likelihood of success and necessity is enough, then there would hardly be any self-defensive acts that would be ruled out by the conditions under discussion. Th is would mean that almost all killing in war would meet these conditions -but so would almost all killing of mafi a members in the above example, and, more generally, the killing of almost anybody connected to V's attackers in a way that gives her some reason to think that the planned aggression would be blocked as a result. In other words, the response just outlined does not really show how IJW can accommodate the necessity condition, but rather how in practice this condition poses no real constraint on self-defense. Th is seems too big a price to pay to salvage IJW. Th is high price is especially troubling given the less-than-full culpability of most soldiers.
Note that although the ex post judgment cannot by itself undermine the moral status of the self-defensive act, it does shift the burden of proof onto the shoulders of soldiers in the ex ante situation in the following sense: given the experience in past wars, soldiers have a good reason to doubt whether their attacks will be both eff ective and necessary. Hence they may not carry them out before fi rst establishing that, notwithstanding this lesson from past wars, some particular attacks can nonetheless be reasonably thought to succeed in defeating the enemy and to do so in the least harmful manner. It is pretty hard to establish that some particular act of warfare -a sniper killing some individual enemy soldier, an aircraft bombing some distant military base -can succeed in making a signifi cant contribution to the defeat of the enemy. It is even harder to establish that there is no less harmful way of doing so.
Finally, if the success and the necessity conditions can be satisfi ed by "any likelihood" (once the triggering condition has been satisfi ed), this should apply to jus ad bellum too, with the implication that waging war might be justifi ed even if the probabilities of success and of necessity were very low indeed. Th e two conditions ("last resort" and "reasonable hope of success") would then be satisfi ed in almost all wars and hence, in practice, stop serving as constraints . One might be tempted to say that the moral status of states is diff erent from that of individuals; therefore the conditions for legitimate self-defense function diff erently when the defense of states is concerned. But this route is unavailable to friends of IJW because for them, "warfare just is the collective of individual rights of self-and other-defense in a coordinated manner against a common threat;" 22 hence, if the above interpretation of these conditions is accepted for individual self-defense, it must apply to wars too. Th us, the price of avoiding an ethic of war which is too demanding at the jus in bello level is to end up with an ethic of war which is too permissive at the jus ad bellum level.
To further clarify this point, let's make the same argument the other way round, from jus ad bellum to jus in bello. According to the accepted understanding of the conditions for jus ad bellum, launching war might be justifi ed only after making sure that the war has a reasonable likelihood of success and only after all alternatives to war -diplomatic measures, economic measures, etc. -have been exhausted. Applying this reading of the success and necessity conditions to jus in bello implies that each individual act of warfare might be justifi ed only after making sure that it has a reasonable likelihood of success and only after all alternatives to it have been exhausted. Yet conducting warfare within such constraints would be virtually impossible.
In response, one might suggest that the necessity condition should be interpreted diff erently in jus ad bellum and in jus in bello. But this move is ad hoc and -once again -runs against the fundamental idea of IJW which assumes that the same conditions guide all forms of self-defense, individual and national alike.
Let me examine two other suggestions to avoid the all too restrictive implications of the necessity condition for warfare. Th e fi rst is to rely on the doctrine of double eff ect ['Double Eff ect'] and permit the unnecessary killing of enemy combatants under the title of collateral damage. Th is suggestion concedes that many enemy soldiers are killed unnecessarily, but says that since many are killed necessarily and since the killing of the former is not intended, it is covered by Double Eff ect. But I doubt whether Double Eff ect can do the required justifi catory work. Th e enemy soldiers whose killing is unnecessary for victory are not killed incidentally, as a side -eff ect, but are directly targeted and killed -by bullets, bombs, and rockets -together with those soldiers whose deaths are necessary. One cannot seriously claim that in bombing the enemy headquarters, one intends to kill only those soldiers the killing of whom meets the requirements of the success condition and the necessity condition, while all the other soldiers are killed incidentally. 23 Th is seems more like a reduction of Double Eff ect than like a helpful reliance on it.
22 See text near note 14 above. 23 For a similar reason, Double Eff ect cannot solve the problem of how it might be justifi ed to kill enemy soldiers given that many (probably most) of them are not morally culpable for the war in which they are participating. One cannot seriously say that the non-culpable enemy Th e second suggestion is that the necessity condition does not require that each individual act of killing in war be necessary, only that the total number of enemy soldiers who are killed be necessary. From the point of view of the right to self-defense, given that all enemy soldiers are legitimate targets, it makes no moral diff erence which soldier exactly is killed. Th erefore, if the attacked side needs to kill no less than, say, 10% of the enemy force in order to defend itself, it is allowed to do so without having to establish that each individual act of killing is necessary. If, to defeat the unjust side, the just side has to kill approximately one thousand soldiers out of soldiers S1, S2 … Sn, then it satisfi es the necessity condition if it kills any of (S1 v S2 … v Sn), provided that the number does not exceed one thousand. (Nor should the number go too much below one thousand; otherwise it would fail to meet the success condition.) And while establishing the necessity for each individual killing is a mission impossible, establishing the necessity for some number of killings which is necessary for victory is not.
Th is is a tempting solution to our puzzle, but I doubt if it will work. It relies on two dubious premises: (a) Th at we have a fair idea about the number of enemy soldiers who must be killed in all wars (or in some specifi c war), and (b) that, in terms of defeating the enemy, it makes no diff erence which enemy soldiers are targeted (hence the above disjunction). But there is no way of making serious and responsible estimates in advance regarding the number (or the percentage) of enemy soldiers the killing of whom would be necessary for victory, and there is no basis for thinking that killing one soldier (a senior offi cer, for example) is just as eff ective as killing another (a military truck driver) in order to defeat the enemy.
If none of these solutions is convincing, we are left with the puzzle with which we started, namely, that the necessity condition can't be satisfi ed at the level of jus in bello, which implies that wars can't be fought justly. And if wars can't be fought justly, they must be morally prohibited, which means that pacifi sm is the only decent response to wars. 24 soldiers may be killed as a side-eff ect of killing the culpable ones. See recently Seth Lazar, "Th e Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War : A Review Essay," Philosophy & Public Aff airs 38 (2010), pp. 210-211 who argues that since modern warfare has no way to sort out the enemy soldiers that are liable to attack from those who are not, in practice "killing in war… will involve widespread and serious rights violations" (211).
24 Th is conclusion does not preclude the possibility that states, or individual soldiers fi ghting on their behalf, might be excused for participating in war (and violating the necessity condition), though one would have to show what the excuse is based on. But just war theory as well as commonsense morality assumes that some wars are not only excusable but just.
Th at a consistent application of IJW leads to pacifi sm or to a position very close to it is already not a new idea. Benbaji makes the same point in his critique of McMahan, the central fi gure at the IJW camp, 25 and I try to show that Rodin, another fi gure in that camp, is much more committed to pacifi sm than he himself realizes.
26 Th e argument of this section further substantiates this connection between IJW and pacifi sm by suggesting a certain understanding of the necessity condition and by showing the implications of applying it to jus in bello.
Some readers might be more convinced than I am by one of the above attempts to show that IJW is compatible with the necessity condition for justifi ed self-defense. To such readers, I plead that they at least be open to the possibility that some other account of just war theory can do a better job than IJW in explaining the nature and justifi cation of the limits posed by it. In the next section I point to such an account.
III. Th e Necessity Condition and Non-Individualist Justifi cations for War
In Section II, I argued that since the individualistic view of justifi ed killing in war [IJW] requires the consistent application of the standard conditions for individual self-defense to the domain of war, and since a consistent application of the necessity condition in this domain renders much of the killing in war impermissible, IJW leads to the conclusion that much of the killing in war is not permissible. And this means that IJW must oppose most wars, or, in other words, it must accept pacifi sm.
Two routes to dodge this result suggest themselves. Th e fi rst, still within the framework of self-defense, replaces the individualistic view of justifi ed killing in war (IJW) with a collectivist one (Th e Collectivist View of Justifi ed Killing in War [CJW]). Th e second relies on a diff erent normative framework altogether, viewing the war convention as a tacitly accepted social norm. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to examine the details of these alternatives to IJW. I will limit myself to examining how they account for the 25 necessity condition and whether they do a better job than IJW in blocking the route from this condition to pacifi sm.
A. Th e necessity condition and CJW
According to CJW, part of the justifi cation for killing people in war lies in their very membership of the aggressive collective. A war is a confl ict between collectives which are metaphysically distinct from individuals, 27 and hence warrant a morality of their own -a collective morality -which is diff erent from and irreducible to the morality that governs the relations between individuals. Within such a collectivist morality, soldiers lose their individual faces and become, as far as the war is concerned, just part of the collective.
As indicated at the end of the previous section, CJW, like IJW, functions within the framework of self-defense, which means that the standard conditions for legitimate self-defense apply to it too. Why, then, might one think that the necessity condition poses a weaker constraint on conducting war according to CJW than it does according to IJW? Here is one possible answer. On CJW, when two collectives are engaged in war against one another, the individuals fi ghting in the war lose their identity qua individuals and are completely swallowed up by their respective collectives. It is as if when one collective fi ghts against another, all it sees in front of it is the enemy collective, not individual members of it. Th is seems to imply that the constraints on selfdefense apply only at the level of collectives, which in turn seems to imply that the necessity condition applies only to the measures taken against the enemy collective, not to the measures taken against individual soldiers. And thisfi nally -seems to be the same as saying that the necessity condition applies only at the level of jus ad bellum, not at the level of jus in bello. What the necessity condition requires is that the war against the enemy collective be necessary, not that each attack against any enemy soldier or enemy post be necessary. What the necessity condition requires is that the war be a last resort (as required by the standard formulation of just war theory), not that individual acts of warfare be so.
To further substantiate this line of defense, consider the following analogy. When an individual is attacked by a culpably unjust aggressor, she is allowed to use force in order to defend herself from the attack. But this surely doesn't mean that she needs to show that each individual hit or kick is necessary to block the attack. In a similar way, one might argue that when a collectivewhich, under CJW, is a kind of agent irreducible to the individuals it comprises -is fi ghting to defend itself, it does not need to justify each act of warfare it engages in, or each case of killing or wounding an enemy soldier. It needs to care about necessity only at the level of jus ad bellum, not at the level of jus in bello.
However, this reading of CJW takes the analogy between individuals and collective entities too far. It is one thing to say that wars have an irreducible collective dimension. It is a diff erent thing to say that the collective dimension is all that exists, that the individual faces are completely lost in them. Zohar's suggestion that the morality of war is a dual one, comprising both collectivist and individualist dimensions, sounds much more plausible. 28 But within such a morality, there is no reason why the necessity condition should apply only to defensive acts against the enemy collective, at the level of jus ad bellum , and not to defensive acts against enemy individuals, at the level of jus in bello .
A diff erent reading of CJW would see it as a theory about the conditions for being liable to self-defensive attack, not as a theory about the constraints on mounting such attacks. While on IJW, a necessary condition for such liability is posing a threat to a potential victim, namely, being an aggressor , on CJW, membership in the aggressive collective is suffi cient. But on this reading, CJW does not aff ect the standard constraints on self-defense, namely, the success condition, the necessity condition, and the proportionality condition. It explains how individuals might be targeted even though they are not aggressors (nor threats) in the usual sense of the word. It fails to explain how they might be targeted even if doing so is not necessary to provide the desired defense from the threat posed by the enemy collective.
B. Th e necessity condition and CONTRACT
Th e challenges posed by IJW to traditional just war theory, especially those developed by McMahan, have led some thinkers to suggest a diff erent ground for this theory, according to which concepts other than self-defense do the main work in explaining the moral status of killing in war. Central to this endeavor is the reciprocal 29 or the contractual understanding of the morality of war. Let's call this 'Th e Contractual View of the War Convention' or 'CONTRACT.' 30 Benbaji explains it as follows: states have a strong interest in being able to defend themselves from unjust attacks against them; since they cannot be sure that they will always be the stronger party in such confl icts, they have an interest in limited, rule-governed wars over unlimited, "total" ones; since deciding on such rules would be impossible once a war breaks out, they have an interest in agreeing on such rules ex ante . Such an agreement would be guided by a desire to minimize the harm of war, on the one hand, without making it impractical to win it, on the other. In Benbaji's view, then:
[T]he objective of the contracting parties is minimizing the harm infl icted on morally innocent people within wars, without limiting the rights states have to use force in protecting their just claims.
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How would the necessity condition fi gure in this view? Th e objective of minimizing the harm infl icted by war while still being able to fi ght seems to be precisely what the necessity condition requires -bringing about no more harm than necessary. But following the argument in Section II, if the necessity condition required that each individual act of warfare be shown to be necessary, that would make war practically impossible. Hence, this understanding of the necessity condition is inconsistent with CONTRACT, according to which the conventions of war must be such that they do not preclude eff ective self-defense.
Th is is all the more so with regard to the proportionality condition, insofar as it is interpreted, like in theories of self-defense, as a constraint on the measures that might be taken against an attacker (rather than against third parties 30 In "Proportionality in the Morality of War," Hurka seems to hold a view close to, if not identical with IJW. He says that "the structure of just war theory closely parallels that of the morality of self-defense" (38) and later says in terms reminiscent of McMahan (see citation near note 14 above) that in a legitimate military action "a large group of individuals act collectively, through their political institutions to protect the rights of another large group of individuals, who may be themselves." In "Proportionality and Necessity," 136, however, he seems to shift to a contractual view of war, at least insofar as the moral status of soldiers is concerned. or innocent bystanders). Th us understood, the proportionality condition is even more demanding than the necessity condition; hence if CONTRACT fi nds the necessity condition too demanding (again, in jus in bello), then surely it would fi nd the proportionality condition too demanding as well. A war convention that included the proportionality condition would impose too strong a constraint on the ability of states to use force in protecting their just claims.
If the loosening of these two conditions, necessity and proportionality, on the conduct of warfare sounds too permissive, they are no more permissive than other features of CONTRACT, mainly the permission they grant to unjust combatants (=combatants of the unjust side) to kill just combatants (=combatants of the just side) who, by defi nition, are morally innocent in the relevant sense. If, under CONTRACT, it is permissible to kill combatants in war even if they pose no illegitimate threat , then it is not unreasonable to assume that it might be permissible to kill combatants even if such killing is not necessary (in the sense prevalent in moral and legal theories of individual self-defense) to achieve the goals of the war.
Th e diff erence between IJW and CONTRACT with respect to the necessity condition has to do with the diff erent role of self-defense in each of these theories. In IJW, the ultimate justifi cation for all killing in war lies in the right to self-defense, which means that each act of killing in war must ultimately meet all the conditions for legitimate self-defense. By contrast, in CONTRACT, the ultimate justifi cation lies in the assumed contract between the fi ghting parties, self-defense coming into play only as the rationale that underlies the parties' decision to undertake the contract.
To sum up, according to Th e Individualist View of Justifi ed Killing in War, the same constraints that limit the use of otherwise immoral measures in individual self-defense apply to collective self-defense too, which means that the necessity condition (as well as the other conditions for justifi ed self-defense) must be met in all cases of killing in war. I expressed doubt as to whether this condition could be met, and I argued that, if it cannot, we are on a road -a dangerous one, in my view -to pacifi sm. I then suggested that the contractual view of killing in war off ers a better way of dealing with this issue, a way that, on the one hand, grants the necessity condition a role in moral reasoning about war, while, on the other, does not lead to pacifi sm. At least in this respect, CONTRACT has an advantage over other candidates in explaining how wars might be fought justly.
